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Abstract
We contrast Bonanno’s ‘Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework’ [15]
with preference change and belief revision from the perspective of dy-
namic epistemic logic (DEL). For that, we extend the logic of commu-
nication and change of [11] with relational substitutions [8] for prefer-
ence change, and show that this does not alter its properties. Next we
move to a more constrained context where belief and knowledge can
be defined from preferences [29; 14; 5; 7], prove completeness of a very
expressive logic of belief revision, and define a mechanism for updating
belief revision models using a combination of action priority update [7]
and preference substitution [8].
1 Reconstructing AGM Style Belief Revision
Bonanno’s paper offers a rational reconstruction of Alchourro´n Ga¨rdenfors
Makinson style belief revision (AGM belief revision) [1] (see also [22] and
[23]), in a framework where modalities B for single agent belief and I for
being informed are mixed with a next time operator © and its inverse ©−1.
Both the AGM framework and Bonanno’s reconstruction of it do not ex-
plicitly represent the triggers that cause belief change in the first place. Iφ
expresses that the agent is informed that φ, but the communicative action
that causes this change in information state is not represented. Also, φ is re-
stricted to purely propositional formulas. Another limitation that Bonanno’s
reconstruction shares with AGM is that it restricts attention to a single agent:
changes of the beliefs of agents about the beliefs of other agents are not an-
alyzed. In these respects [15] is close to Dynamic Doxastic Logic (DDL), as
developed in [38; 39].
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AGM style belief revision was proposed more than twenty years ago, and
has grown into a paradigm in its own right in artificial intelligence. In the
meanwhile rich frameworks of dynamic epistemic logic have emerged that
are quite a bit more ambitious in their goals than AGM was when it was
first proposed. AGM analyzes operations +φ for expanding with φ, −φ for
retracting φ and ∗φ for revising with φ. It is formulated in a purely syntactic
way, it hardly addresses issues of semantics, it does not propose sound and
complete axiomatisations. It did shine in 1985, and it still shines now, but
perhaps in a more modest way.
Bonanno’s paper creates a nice link between this style of belief revision
and epistemic/doxastic logic. While similar in spirit to Segerberg’s work,
it addresses the question of the rational reconstruction of AGM style belief
revision more explicitly. This does add quite a lot to that framework: clear
semantics, and a sound and complete axiomatisation. Still, it is fair to say
that this rational reconstruction, nice as it is, also inherits the limitations of
the original design.
2 A Broader Perspective
Meanwhile, epistemic logic has entered a different phase, with a new focus
on the epistemic and doxastic effects of information updates such as public
announcements [34; 24]. Public announcements are interesting because they
create common knowledge, so the new focus on information updating fostered
an interest in the evolution of multi-agent knowledge and belief under acts of
communication.
Public announcement was generalized to updates with ‘action models’ that
can express a wide range of communications (private announcements, group
announcements, secret sharing, lies, and so on) in [4] and [3]. A further
generalization to a complete logic of communication and change, with enriched
actions that allow changing the facts of the world, was provided in [11]. The
textbook treatment of dynamic epistemic logic in [20] bears witness to the
fact that this approach is by now well established.
The above systems of dynamic epistemic logic do provide an account of
knowledge or belief update, but they do not analyse belief revision in the
sense of AGM. Information updating in dynamic epistemic logic is monotonic:
facts that are announced to an audience of agents cannot be unlearnt. Van
Benthem [8] calls this ‘belief change under hard information’ or ‘eliminative
belief revision’. See also [19] for reflection on the distinction between this and
belief change under soft information.
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Assume a state of the world where p actually is the case, and where you
know it, but I do not. Then public announcement of p will have the effect
that I get to know it, but also that you know that I know it, that I know that
you know that I know it, in short, that p becomes common knowledge. But
if this announcement is followed by an announcement of ¬p, the effect will be
inconsistent knowledge states for both of us.
It is clear that AGM deals with belief revision of a different kind: ‘belief
change under soft information’ or ‘non-eliminative belief revision’. In [8] it is
sketched how this can be incorporated into dynamic epistemic logic, and in
the closely related [7] a theory of ‘doxastic actions’ is developed that can be
seen as a further step in this direction.
Belief revision under soft information can, as Van Benthem observes, be
modelled as change in the belief accessibilities of a model. This is different
from public announcement, which can be viewed as elimination of worlds while
leaving the accessibilities untouched.
Agent i believes that φ in a given world w if it is the case that φ is true
in all worlds t that are reachable from w and that are minimal for a suitable
plausibility ordering relation ≤i. In the dynamic logic of belief revision these
accessibilities can get updated in various ways. An example from [36] that
is discussed in [8] is ⇑ A for so-called ‘lexicographic upgrade’: all A worlds
get promoted past all non-A worlds, while within the A worlds and within
the non-A worlds the preference relation stays as before. Clearly this relation
upgrade has as effect that it creates belief in A. And the belief upgrade can
be undone: a next update with ⇑ ¬A does not result in inconsistency.
Van Benthem [8] gives a complete dynamic logic of belief upgrade for the
belief upgrade operation ⇑ A, and another one for a variation on it, ↑ A, or
‘elite change’, that updates a plausibility ordering to a new one where the
best A worlds get promoted past all other worlds, and for the rest the old
ordering remains unchanged.
This is taken one step further in a general logic for changing preferences,
in Van Benthem and Liu [9], where upgrade as relation change is handled for
(reflexive and transitive) preference relations ≤i, by means of a variation on
product update called product upgrade. The idea is to keep the domain, the
valuation and the epistemic relations the same, but to reset the preferences
by means of a substitution of new pre-orders for the preference relations.
Treating knowledge as an equivalence and preference as a pre-order, with-
out constraining the way in which they relate, as is done in [9], has the ad-
vantage of generality (one does not have to specify what ‘having a preference’
means), but it makes it harder to use the preference relation for modelling be-
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lief change. If one models ‘regret’ as preferring a situation that one knows to
be false to the current situation, then it follows that one can regret things one
cannot even conceive. And using the same preference relation for belief looks
strange, for this would allow beliefs that are known to be false. Van Benthem
(private communication) advised me not to lose sleep over such philosophi-
cal issues. If we follow that advice, and call ‘belief’ what is true in all most
preferred worlds, we can still take comfort from the fact that this view en-
tails that one can never believe one is in a bad situation: the belief-accessible
situations are by definition the best conceivable worlds. Anyhow, proceeding
from the assumption that knowledge and preference are independent basic
relations and then studying possible relations between them has turned out
very fruitful: the recent theses by Girard [26] and Liu [33] are rich sources of
insight in what a logical study of the interaction of knowledge and preference
may reveal.
Here we will explore two avenues, different from the above but related to
it. First, we assume nothing at all about the relation between knowledge on
one hand and preference on the other. We show that the dynamic logic of
this (including updating with suitable finite update models) is complete and
decidable: Theorem 3.1 gives an extension of the reducibility result for LCC,
the general logic of communication and change proposed and investigated in
[11].
Next, we move closer to the AGM perspective, by postulating a close
connection between knowledge, belief and preference. One takes preferences
as primary, and imposes minimal conditions to allow a definition of knowledge
from preferences. The key to this is the simple observation in Theorem 4.1 that
a preorder can be turned into an equivalence by taking its symmetric closure
if and only if it is weakly connected and conversely weakly connected. This
means that by starting from weakly and converse weakly connected preorders
one can interpret their symmetric closures as knowledge relations, and use the
preferences themselves to define conditional beliefs, in the well known way
that was first proposed in Boutillier [16] and Halpern [30]. The multi-agent
version of this kind of conditional belief was further explored in [12] and in [5;
7]. We extend this to a complete logic of regular doxastic programs for belief
revision models (Theorem 4.3), useful for reasoning about common knowledge,
common conditional belief and their interaction. Finally, we make a formal
proposal for a belief change mechanism by means of a combination of action
model update in the style of [7] and plausibility substitution in the style of
[9].
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3 Preference Change in LCC
An epistemic preference model M for set of agents I is a tuple (W,V,R, P )
where W is a non-empty set of worlds, V is a propositional valuation, R is a
function that maps each agent i to a relation Ri (the epistemic relation for i),
and P is a function that maps each agent i to a preference relation Pi. There
are no conditions at all on the Ri and the Pi (just as there are no constraints
on the Ri relations in LCC [11]).
We fix a PDL style language for talking about epistemic preference models
(assume p ranges over a set of basic propositions Prop and i over a set of agents
I):
φ ::= > | p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | [pi]φ
pi ::= ∼i | ≥i |?φ | pi1;pi2 | pi1 ∪ pi2 | pi∗
This is to be interpreted in the usual PDL manner, with [[[pi]]]M giving the
relation that interprets relational expression pi in M = (W,V,R, P ), where
∼i is interpreted as the relation Ri and ≥i as the relation Pi, and where the
complex modalities are handled by the regular operations on relations. We
employ the usual abbreviations: ⊥ is shorthand for ¬>, φ1 ∨ φ2 is shorthand
for ¬(¬φ1 ∧¬φ2), φ1 → φ2 is shorthand for ¬(φ1 ∧φ2), φ1 ↔ φ2 is shorthand
for (φ1 → φ2) ∧ (φ2 → φ1), and 〈pi〉φ is shorthand for ¬[pi]¬φ.
[pi]φ is true in world w of M if for all v with (w, v) ∈ [[[pi]]]M it holds that
φ is true in v. This is completely axiomatised by the usual PDL rules and
axioms ([37; 31]):
Modus ponens and axioms for propositional logic
Modal generalisation From ` φ infer ` [pi]φ
Normality ` [pi](φ→ ψ)→ ([pi]φ→ [pi]ψ)
Test ` [?φ]ψ ↔ (φ→ ψ)
Sequence ` [pi1;pi2]φ↔ [pi1][pi2]φ
Choice ` [pi1 ∪ pi2]φ↔ ([pi1]φ ∧ [pi2]φ)
Mix ` [pi∗]φ↔ (φ ∧ [pi][pi∗]φ)
Induction ` (φ ∧ [pi∗](φ→ [pi]φ))→ [pi∗]φ
In [11] it is proved that extending the PDL language with a extra modality
[A, e]φ does not change the expressive power of the language. Interpretation
of the new modality: [A, e]φ is true in w in M if success of the update of M
with action model A to M⊗A implies that φ is true in (w, e) in M⊗A. To
see what that means one has to grasp the definition of update models A and
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the update product operation ⊗, which we will now give for the epistemic
preference case.
An action model (for agent set I) is like an epistemic preference model
for I, with the difference that the worlds are now called events, and that the
valuation has been replaced by a precondition map pre that assigns to each
event e a formula of the language called the precondition of e. From now on
we call the epistemic preference models static models.
Updating a static model M = (W,V,R, P ) with an action model A =
(E,pre,R,P) succeeds if the set
{(w, e) | w ∈W, e ∈ E,M, w |= pre(e)}
is non-empty. The update result is a new static modelM⊗A = (W ′, V ′, R′, P ′)
with
• W ′ = {(w, e) | w ∈W, e ∈ E,M, w |= pre(e)},
• V ′(w, e) = V (w),
• R′i is given by {(w, e), (v, f)) | (w, v) ∈ Ri, (e, f) ∈ Ri},
• P ′i is given by {(w, e), (v, f)) | (w, v) ∈ Pi, (e, f) ∈ Pi}.
If the static model has a set of distinguished states W0 and the action model
a set of distinguished events E0, then the distinguished worlds of M⊗A are
the (w, e) with w ∈W0 and e ∈ E0.
wine
 abc
water
 ab
beer
 a
 abc
 a
 abc
no wine  abc
true
 abc
 abc
Figure 1. Static model and update
Figure 1 gives an example pair of a static model with an update action.
The distinguished worlds of the model and the distinguished event of the
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Figure 2. Update result, before and after reduction under bisimulation
action model are shaded grey. Only the R relations are drawn, for three
agents a, b, c. The result of the update is shown in Figure 2, on the left.
This result can be reduced to the bisimilar model on the right in the same
figure, with the bisimulation linking the distinguished worlds. The result of
the update is that the distinguished “wine” world has disappeared, without
any of a, b, c being aware of the change.
In LCC, action update is extended with factual change, which is handled
by propositional substitution. Here we will consider another extension, with
preference change, handled by preference substitution (first proposed in [9]).
A preference substitution is a map from agents to PDL program expressions
pi represented by a finite set of bindings
{i1 7→ pi1, . . . , in 7→ pin}
where the ij are agents, all different, and where the pii are program expressions
from our PDL language. It is assumed that each i that does not occur in the
lefthand side of a binding is mapped to ≥i. Call the set {i ∈ I | ρ(i) 6= ≥i} the
domain of ρ. If M = (W,V,R, P ) is a preference model and ρ is a preference
substitution, then Mρ is the result of changing the preference map P of M
to P ρ given by:
P ρ(i) := Pi for i not in the domain of ρ,
P ρ(i) := [[[ρ(i)]]]M for i = ij in the domain of ρ.
Now extend the PDL language with a modality [ρ]φ for preference change,
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with the following interpretation:
M, w |= [ρ]φ :⇐⇒ Mρ, w |= φ.
Then we get a complete logic for preference change:
Theorem 3.1. The logic of epistemic preference PDL with preference change
modalities is complete.
Proof. The preference change effects of [ρ] can be captured by a set of reduc-
tion axioms for [ρ] that commute with all sentential language constructs, and
that handle formulas of the form [ρ][pi]φ by means of reduction axioms of the
form
[ρ][pi]φ ↔ [Fρ(pi)][ρ]φ,
with Fρ given by:
Fρ(∼i) := ∼i
Fρ(≥i) :=
{
ρ(i) if i in the domain of ρ,
≥i otherwise,
Fρ(?φ) := ?[ρ]φ,
Fρ(pi1;pi2) := Fρ(pi1);Fρ(pi2),
Fρ(pi1 ∪ pi2) := Fρ(pi1) ∪ Fρ(pi2),
Fρ(pi∗) := (Fρ(pi))∗.
It is easily checked that these reduction axioms are sound, and that for each
formula of the extended language the axioms yield an equivalent formula
in which [ρ] occurs with lower complexity, which means that the reduction
axioms can be used to translate formulas of the extended language to PDL
formulas. Completeness then follows from the completeness of PDL. q.e.d.
4 Yet Another Logic . . .
In this section we look at a more constrained case, by replacing the epistemic
preference models by ‘belief revision models’ in the style of Grove [29], Board
[14], and Baltag and Smets [5; 7] (who call them ‘multi-agent plausibility
frames’). There is almost complete agreement that preference relations should
be transitive and reflexive (pre-orders). But transitivity plus reflexivity of a
binary relation R do not together imply that R∪Rˇ is an equivalence. Figure 3
gives a counterexample. The two extra conditions of weak connectedness for R
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0
1 2
0
1 2
Figure 3. Preorder with a non-transitive symmetric closure.
and for Rˇ remedy this. A binary relation R is weakly connected (terminology
of [27]) if the following holds:
∀x, y, z((xRy ∧ xRz)→ (yRz ∨ y = z ∨ zRy)).
Theorem 4.1. Assume R is a preorder. Then R ∪ Rˇ is an equivalence iff
both R and Rˇ are weakly connected.
Proof. ⇒: immediate.
⇐: Let R be a a preorder such that both R and Rˇ are weakly connected.
We have to show that R∪Rˇ is an equivalence. Symmetry and reflexivity are
immediate. For the check of transitivity, assume xR∪R yˇ and yR∪R zˇ. There
are four cases. (i) xRyRz. Then xRz by transitivity of R, hence xR ∪ R zˇ.
(ii) xRyR zˇ. Then yRˇx and yR zˇ, and by weak connectedness of R ,ˇ either
(xR zˇ or zRˇx), hence xR ∪ R zˇ, or x = z, hence xRz by reflexivity of R.
Therefore xR ∪ R zˇ in all cases. (iii) xR yˇRz. Similar. (iv) xR yˇR zˇ. Then
zRyRx, and zRx by transitivity of R. Therefore xR ∪R zˇ. q.e.d.
Call a preorder that is weakly connected and conversely weakly connected
locally connected. The example in Figure 4 shows that locally connected pre-
orders need not be connected. Taking the symmetric closure of this example
generates an equivalence with two equivalence classes. More generally, taking
the symmetric closure of a locally connected preorder creates an equivalence
that can play the role of a knowledge relation defined from the preference
order. To interpret the preference order as conditional belief, it is convenient
to assume that it is also well-founded: this makes for a smooth definition of
the notion of a ‘best possible world’.
A belief revision modelM (again, for a set of agents I) is a tuple (W,V, P )
whereW is a non-empty set of worlds, V is a propositional valuation and P is
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0
1
2
3
4
Figure 4. Locally connected preorder that is not connected.
a function that maps each agent i to a preference relation ≤i that is a locally
connected well-preorder. That is, ≤i is a pre-order (reflexive and transitive)
that is well-founded (in terms of <i for the strict part of ≤i, this is the
requirement that there is no infinite sequence of w1, w2, . . . with . . . <i w2 <i
w1), and such that both ≤i and its converse are weakly connected.
In what follows we will use <i with the meaning explained above, ≥i for
the converse of ≤i, >i for the converse of <i, and ∼i for ≤i ∪ ≥i.
The locally connected well-preorders ≤i can be used to induce accessibility
relations →Pi for each subset P of the domain, by means of the following
standard definition:
→Pi := {(x, y) | x ∼i y ∧ y ∈ MIN≤iP},
where MIN≤iP , the set of minimal elements of P under ≤i, is defined as
{s ∈ P : ∀s′ ∈ P (s′ ≤ s⇒ s ≤ s′)}.
This picks out the minimal worlds linked to the current world, according to ≤i,
within the set of worlds satisfying [[φ]]M. The requirement of wellfoundedness
ensures that MIN≤P will be non-empty for non-empty P . Investigating these
→P relations, we see that they have plausible properties for belief:
Proposition 4.2. Let ≤ be a locally connected well-preorder on S and let P
be a non-empty subset of S. Then →P is transitive, euclidean and serial.
Proof. Transitivity: if x →P y then y ∼ x and y ∈ MIN≤P . If y →P z then
z ∼ y and z ∈ MIN≤P . It follows by local connectedness of ≤ that z ∼ x and
by the definition of →P that x→P z.
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Euclideanness: let x→P y and x→P z. We have to show y →P z. From
x →P y, y ∼ x and y ∈ MIN≤P . From x →P z, z ∼ x and z ∈ MIN≤P .
From local connectedness, y ∼ z. Hence y →P z.
Seriality: Let x ∈ P . Since ≤ is a preorder there are y ∈ P with y ≤ x.
The wellfoundedness of ≤ guarantees that there are ≤ minimal such y. q.e.d.
Transitivity, euclideanness and seriality are the frame properties correspond-
ing to positively and negatively introspective consistent belief (KD45 belief,
[18]).
Figure 5 gives an example with both the ≤ relation (shown as solid arrows
in the direction of more preferred worlds, i.e., with an arrow from x to y for
x ≥ y) and the induced → relation on the whole domain (shown as dotted
arrows). The above gives us in fact knowledge relations ∼i together with
0
1
2
3
4
Figure 5. Preference (solid arrows) and belief (dotted arrows).
for each knowledge cell a Lewis-style [32] counterfactual relation: a connected
well-preorder, which can be viewed as a set of nested spheres, with the minimal
elements as the innermost sphere. Compare also the conditional models of
Burgess and Veltman [17; 40] (linked to Dynamic Doxastic Logic in [25]).
Baltag and Smets [7; 6] present logics of individual multi-agent belief and
knowledge for belief revision models, and define belief update for this as a
particular kind of action update in the style of [4], called action priority up-
date. Here we sketch the extension to a system that also handles common
knowledge and common conditional belief, and where the action update has
belief change incorporated in it by means of relational substitution.
The set-up will be less general than in the logic LCC: in LCC no assump-
tions are made about the update actions, and so the accessibility relations
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could easily deteriorate, e.g., as a result of updating with a lie. Since in the
present set-up we make assumptions about the accessibilities (to wit, that
they are locally connected well-preorders), we have to ensure that our update
actions preserve these relational properties.
Consider the following slight modification of the PDL language (again
assume p ranges over a set of basic propositions Prop and i over a set of
agents I):
φ ::= > | p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | [pi]φ
pi ::= ∼i | ≤i | ≥i | →φi | ←φi | G |?φ | pi1;pi2 | pi1 ∪ pi2 | pi∗
Call this language LPref. This time, we treat ∼i as a derived notion, by
putting in an axiom that defines ∼i as ≤i ∪≥i. The intention is to let ∼i be
interpreted as the knowledge relation for agent i, ≤i as the preference relation
for i, ≥i as the converse preference relation for i, →φi as the conditional belief
relation defined from ≤i as explained above, ←φi as its converse, and G as
global accessibility. We use →i as shorthand for →>i .
We have added a global modality G, and we will set up things in such
way that [G]φ expresses that everywhere in the model φ holds, and that 〈G〉φ
expresses that φ holds somewhere. It is well-known that adding a global
modality and converses to PDL does not change its properties: the logic
remains decidable, and satisfiability remains EXPTIME-complete [13].
The semantics of LPref is given relative to belief revision models as in-
dicated above. Formula meaning [[φ]]M and relational meaning [[[pi]]]M are
handled in the usual way. The interpretation of the knowledge relation of
agent i is given by [[[∼i]]]M := ≤Mi ∪ ≥Mi , that for the preference relation of
agent i by [[[≤i]]]M := ≤Mi , that for the converse preference relation of agent i
by its converse, that for the conditional belief of agent i by [[[→φi ]]]M :=→[[φ]]
M
i ,
that for ←φi by its converse. The global modality is interpreted as the uni-
versal relation, and test, sequential composition, choice and Kleene star are
interpreted as usual.
The interplay between the modalities [∼i] (knowledge) and [≥i] (safe be-
lief) is analysed by Baltag and Smets in [7], where they remark that the con-
verse preference modality [≥i] in belief revision models behaves like an S4.3
modality (reflexive, transitive and not forward branching), and lives happily
together with the S5 modality for [∼i].
To see how this all works out, let us have a look at the truth conditions for
[→φi ]ψ. This is true in a world w in modelM if in all worlds v with v ∼i w and
v minimal in [[φ]]]M under ≤i it holds that ψ is true. This is indeed conditional
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belief, relative to φ. Compare this with [≥i]ψ. This is true in a world w if in
all worlds that are at least as preferred, ψ is true. Finally, [∼i]ψ is true in w
if ψ is true in all worlds, preferred or not, that i can access from w.
As a further example, consider a situation where Alexandru is drinking
wine, while Jan does not know whether he is drinking wine or beer, and Sonja
thinks that he is drinking tea. The actual situation is shaded grey, Jan’s
preference relation has solid lines, that of Sonja dotted lines. Reflexive arrows
are not drawn, so Alexandru’s preferences are not visible in the picture.
wine beer
tea
In the actual world it is true that Jan knows that Alexandru knows what
Alexandru is drinking: [∼j ]([∼a]w∨[∼a]b), and that Sonja believes Alexandru
is drinking tea and that Alexandru knows it: [s][∼a]t. Under condition ¬t,
however, Sonja has the belief in the actual world that Alexandru is drinking
beer: [→¬ts ]b. Moreover, Jan and Sonja have a common belief under condition
¬t that Alexandru is drinking wine or beer: [→¬tj ∪→¬ts ; (→¬tj ∪→¬ts )∗](w∨b).
As a final illustration, note that [←s]⊥ is true in a world if this is not among
Sonja’s most preferred worlds. Notice that if Sonja conditionalizes her belief
to these worlds, she would believe that Alexandru is drinking beer: [→[sˇ]⊥s ]b
is true in the actual world.
It should be clear from the example that this language is very expressive.
To get at a complete logic for it, we need axioms and rules for propositional
logic, S5 axioms for the global modality (Goranko and Passy [28]), axioms
for forward connectedness of ≥ and of ≤ (see Goldblatt [27]), axioms for
converse, relating ≤ to ≥ and → to ←, as in temporal logic (Prior [35]),
and the general axioms and rules for PDL (Segerberg [37]). Finally, add the
following definition of conditional belief in terms of knowledge and safe belief
that can already be found in Boutillier [16] as an axiom:
[→φi ]ψ :≡ 〈∼i〉φ→ 〈∼i〉(φ ∧ [≥i](φ→ ψ)).
This definition (also used in [7]) states that conditional to φ, i believes in ψ
if either there are no accessible φ worlds, or there is an accessible φ world in
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which the belief in φ→ ψ is safe. The full calculus for LPref is given in Figure
6.
Modus ponens and axioms for propositional logic
Modal generalisation From ` φ infer ` [pi]φ
Normality ` [pi](φ→ ψ)→ ([pi]φ→ [pi]ψ)
Inclusion of everything in G ` [G]φ→ [pi]φ
Reflexivity of G ` [G]φ→ φ
Transitivity of G ` [G]φ→ [G][G]φ
Symmetry of G ` φ→ [G]〈G〉φ
Knowledge definition ` [∼i]φ↔ [≤i ∪ ≥i]φ
Truthfulness of safe belief ` [≥i]φ→ φ
Transitivity of safe belief ` [≥i]φ→ [≥i][≥i]φ
≥ included in ≤ˇ ` φ→ [≥i]〈≤i〉φ
≤ included in ≥ˇ ` φ→ [≤i]〈≥i〉φ
Weak connectedness of ≤ ` [≤i]((φ ∧ [≤i]φ)→ ψ) ∨ [≤i]((ψ ∧ [≤i]ψ)→ φ)
Weak connectedness of ≥ ` [≥i]((φ ∧ [≥i]φ)→ ψ) ∨ [≥i]((ψ ∧ [≥i]ψ)→ φ)
Conditional belief definition ` [→φi ]ψ ↔ (〈∼i〉φ→ 〈∼i〉(φ ∧ [≥i](φ→ ψ)))
→ included in ←ˇ ` φ→ [→ψi ]〈←ψi 〉φ
← included in →ˇ ` φ→ [←ψi ]〈→ψi 〉φ
Test ` [?φ]ψ ↔ (φ→ ψ)
Sequence ` [pi1;pi2]φ↔ [pi1][pi2]φ
Choice ` [pi1 ∪ pi2]φ↔ ([pi1]φ ∧ [pi2]φ)
Mix ` [pi∗]φ↔ (φ ∧ [pi][pi∗]φ)
Induction ` (φ ∧ [pi∗](φ→ [pi]φ))→ [pi∗]φ
Figure 6. Axiom system for LPref.
Theorem 4.3. The axiom system for LPref is complete for belief revision
models; LPref has the finite model property and is decidable.
Proof. Modify the canonical model construction for modal logic for the case
of PDL, by means of Fischer-Ladner closures [21] (also see [13]). This gives a
finite canonical model with the properties for ≤i and ≥i corresponding to the
axioms (since the axioms for ≤i and ≥i are canonical). In particular, each ≥i
relation will be reflexive, transitive and weakly connected, each relation ≤i
will be weakly connected, and the ≤i and ≥i relations will be converses of each
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other. Together this gives (Theorem 4.1) that the ≤i ∪ ≥i are equivalences.
Since the canonical model has a finite set of nodes, each ≤i relation is also
well-founded. Thus, the canonical model is in fact a belief revision model.
Also, the →i and ←i relations are converses of each other, and related to the
≥i relations in the correct way. The canonical model construction gives us
for each consistent formula φ a belief revision model satisfying φ with a finite
set of nodes. Only finitely many of the relations in that model are relevant to
the satisfiability of φ, so this gives a finite model (see [13] for further details).
Since the logic has the finite model property it is decidable. q.e.d.
Since the axiomatisation is complete, the S5 properties of ∼i are derivable,
as well as the principle that knowledge implies safe belief:
[∼i]φ→ [≥i]φ.
The same holds for the following principles for conditional belief given in
Board [14]:
Safe belief implies belief ` [≥i]φ→ [→ψi ]φ
Positive introspection ` [→ψi ]φ→ [∼i][→ψi]φ
Negative introspection ` ¬[→ψi ]φ→ [∼i]¬[→ψi ]φ
Successful revision ` [→φi ]φ
Minimality of revision ` 〈→φi 〉ψ → ([iφ∧ψ]χ↔ [→φi ](ψ → χ))
We end with an open question: is →φi definable from ≥i and ≤i using only
test, sequence, choice and Kleene star?
5 Combining Update and Upgrade
The way we composed knowledge and belief by means of regular operations
may have a dynamic flavour, but appearance is deceptive. The resulting
doxastic and epistemic ‘programs’ still describe what goes on in a static model.
Real communicative action is changing old belief revision models into new
ones. These actions should represent new hard information that cannot be
undone, but also soft information like belief changes that can be reversed
again later on. For this we can use update action by means of action models,
with soft information update handled by means of action priority update [7;
6], or preference substitution as in [9]. Here we will propose a combination of
these two.
Action models for belief revision are like belief revision models, but with
the valuation replaced by a precondition map. We add two extra ingredients.
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First, we add to each event a propositional substitution, to be used, as in LCC,
for making factual changes to static models. Propositional substitutions are
maps represented as sets of bindings
{p1 7→ φ1, . . . , pn 7→ φn}
where all the pi are different. It is assumed that each p that does not occur in
the lefthand side of a binding is mapped to p. The domain of a propositional
substitution σ is the set {p ∈ Prop | σ(p) 6= p}. If M = (W,V, P ) is a belief
revision model and σ is an LPref propositional substitution, then V σM is the
valuation given by λwλp ·w ∈ [[pσ]]M. In other words, V σM assigns to w the set
of basic propositions p such that pσ is true in world w in modelM. Mσ is the
model with its valuation changed by σ as indicated. Next, we add relational
substitutions, as defined in Section 3, one to each event. Thus, an action
model for belief revision is a tuple A = (E,pre,P,psub, rsub) with E a
non-empty finite set of events, psub and rsub maps from E to propositional
substitutions and relational substitutions, respectively, and with rsub subject
to the following constraint:
If e ∼i f in the action model, then rsub(e) and rsub(f) have the same
binding for i.
This ensures a coherent definition of the effect of relational substitution on a
belief structure. The example in Figure 7 illustrates this. But note that the
substitutions are subject to further constraints. In the action model in the
1:p
2:-p
3: >= := <=
4: true
Figure 7. Unconstrained relational substitution creates havoc.
example, a single agent has a preference for ¬p over p. In the update model, a
substitution reverses the agent’s preferences, but the agent cannot distinguish
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this from an action where nothing happens. What should the result of the
update look like? E.g., is there a preference arrow from (2, 3) to (1, 4)? This is
impossible to answer, as action 3 asks us to reverse the preference and action 4
demands that we keep the initial preference. The constraint on substitutions
rules out such dilemmas.
The relational substitution ρ = rsub(e) at event e in action model A is
meant to to be interpreted ‘locally’ at each world w in input model M. If P
is the preference map of M, then let P ρw be given by:
P ρw(i) := Pi ∩ |w|2[[[∼i]]]M for i not in the domain of ρ,
P ρw(i) := [[[ρ(i)]]]
M ∩ |w|2[[[∼i]]]M
for i = ij in the domain of ρ.
Thus, P ρw is the result of making a change only to the local knowledge cell at
world w of agent i (which is given by the equivalence class |w|[[[∼i]]]M). Let
P ρ(i) :=
⋃
w∈W
P ρw(i)
Then P ρ(i) gives the result of the substitution ρ on P (i), for each knowledge
cell |w|[[[∼i]]]M for i, and P ρ gives the result of the substitution ρ on P , for each
agent i.
Now the result of updating belief revision model M = (W,V, P ) with
action model A = (E,pre,P,psub, rsub) is given by M⊗A = (W ′, V ′, P ′),
where
• W ′ = {(w, e) | w ∈W, e ∈ E,M, w |= pre(e)},
• V ′(w, e) = V σ(w),
• P ′(i) is given by the anti-lexicographical order defined from P ρ(i) and
P(i) (see [7; 6]).
With these definitions in place, what are reasonable substitutions? A possible
general form for a preference change could be a binding like this:
≥i 7→ [φ1, φ2, . . . , φn].
This is to be interpreted as an instruction to replace the belief preferences of i
in the local knowledge cells by the new preference relation that prefers the φ1
states above everything else, the ¬φ1 ∧φ2 above the ¬φ1 ∧¬φ2 states, and so
on, and the ¬φ1∧¬φ2∧· · ·∧¬φn−1∧φn states above the ¬φ1∧¬φ2∧· · ·∧¬φn
states. Such relations are indeed connected well-preorders.
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most
 preferred
least
 preferred
Note that we can take [φ1, φ2, . . . , φn] as an abbreviation for the following
doxastic program:
(∼i; ?φ1) ∪ (?¬φ1;∼i; ?¬φ1; ?φ2)
∪ (?¬φ1; ?¬φ2;∼i; ?¬φ1; ?¬φ2; ?φ3)
∪ · · ·
∪ (?¬φ1; · · · ; ?¬φn;∼i; ?¬φ1; · · · ; ?¬φn−1; ?φn)
In general we have to be careful (as is also observed in [9]). If we have a
connected well-preorder then adding arrows to it in the same knowledge cell
may spoil its properties. Also, the union of two connected well-preorders need
not be connected. So here is a question: what is the maximal sublanguage of
doxastic programs that still guarantees that the defined relations are suitable
preference relations? Or should belief revision models be further constrained
to guarantee felicitous preference change? And if so: how?
6 Examples
Global amnesia: the event of agent a (Jason Bourne) forgetting all his beliefs,
with everyone (including himself) being aware of this, is represented by the
following action model (for the case of three agents a, b, c):
a := G  abc
Alzheimer: the event of agent a forgetting everything, with the others being
aware of this, while a wrongly believes that nothing has happened. It is
tempting to model this with the following update model:
a := G
 abc
true a
 abc
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Note however that this does not satisfy the constraint on relation update (the
two actions are connected, but the substitution for a is not the same), so it
may result in incoherent models.
Lacular amnesia (specific forgetting): forgetting everything about p. One
way to model this is by means of an action model with a single action, acces-
sible to all, with the relational substitution
≥i 7→ (≥i ∪ ∼i; ?¬p)∗
This will effectively add best-world arrows from everywhere in the knowledge
cell to all ¬p worlds.
Confession of faith in p, or publicly accepting p: an action model with a
single action, accessible to all, with the relational substitution
≥i 7→ (≥i ∪ (?¬p;∼i; ?p))∗.
This will make the p worlds better than the ¬p worlds everywhere.
Submission to a guru: the act of adopting the belief of someone else,
visible to all. A problem here is that the guru may know more than I do, so
that the guru’s preferences within my knowledge cell may not be connected.
This means that the substitution ≤i 7→ ≤j — the binding that expresses
that i takes over j’s beliefs — may involve growth or loss of knowledge for
i. Consider the example of the wine-drinking Alexandru again: if Jan were
to take over Sonja’s beliefs, he would lose the information that Alexandru is
drinking an alcoholic beverage.
Conformism: adopting the common beliefs of a certain group, visible to
all: an action model with a single action accessible to all, with the following
substitution for conformist agent i:
≥i 7→ (≥i ∪ ≥j); (≥i ∪ ≥j)∗.
Belief coarsening: the most preferred worlds remain the most preferred, the
next preferred remain the next preferred, and all further distinctions are
erased. An action model with a single action accessible to all, and the follow-
ing substitution for agent i:
≥i 7→ →i ∪ ?>.
The union with the relation ?> has the effect of adding all reflexive arrows,
to ensure that the result is reflexive again.
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Van Benthem’s ⇑ φ is handled by a substitution consisting of bindings like
this:
≥i 7→ (?φ;∼i?¬φ) ∪ (?φ;≥i?φ) ∪ (?¬φ;≥i?¬φ).
This is an alternative for an update with an action model that has ¬φ <B
φ. The example shows that conservative upgrade is handled equally well by
action priority updating and by belief change via substitution. But belief
change by substitution seems more appropriate for ‘elite change’. For this we
need a test for being in the best φ world that i can conceive, by means of
the Panglossian formula 〈←φi 〉>. The negation of this allows us to define elite
change like this:
≥i 7→ →φi ∪ (≥i; ?[←φi ]⊥).
This promotes the best φ worlds past all other worlds, while leaving the
rest of the ordering unchanged. Admittedly, such an operation could also
be performed using action priority updating, but it would be much more
cumbersome.
7 Further Connections
To connect up to the work of Bonanno again, what about time? Note that
perceiving the ticking of a clock can be viewed as information update. A clock
tick constitutes a change in the world, and agents can be aware or unaware
of the change. This can be modelled within the framework introduced above.
Let t1, . . . , tn be the clock bits for counting ticks in binary, and let C := C+1
be shorthand for the propositional substitution that is needed to increment
the binary number t1, . . . , tn by 1. Then public awareness of the clock tick is
modelled by:
C := C+1  abc
Thus, perception of the ticking of a clock can be modelled as ‘being in tune
with change in the world’. Still, this is not quite the same as the ‘next
instance’ operator ©, for the DEL framework is specific about what happens
during the clock tick, while © existentially quantifies over the change that
takes place, rather in the spirit of [2].
In belief revision there is the AGM tradition, and its rational reconstruc-
tion in dynamic doxastic logic a` la Segerberg. Now there also is a modal
version in Bonanno style using temporal logic. It is shown in [10] that tem-
poral logic has greater expressive power than DEL, which could be put to
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use in a temporal logic of belief revision (although Bonanno’s present version
does not seem to harness this power). As an independent development there
is dynamic epistemic logic in the Amsterdam/Oxford tradition, which was
inspired by the logic of public announcement, and by the epistemic turn in
game theory, a` la Aumann. Next to this, and not quite integrated with it,
there is an abundance of dynamic logics for belief change based on preference
relations (Spohn, Shoham, Lewis), and again the Amsterdam and Oxford tra-
ditions. I hope this contribution has made clear that an elegant fusion of
dynamic epistemic logic and dynamic logics for belief change is possible, and
that this fusion allows to analyze AGM style belief revision in a multi-agent
setting, and integrated within a powerful logic of communication and change.
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